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Abstract 
In this paper we discuss the shaping of a security policy in an Indonesian bank. Theoretically we use a 
framework grounded in Institutional and Structural theory. It is important to understand the shaping of security 
policies in organizations since majority of information systems (IS) security research, while acknowledging the 
importance, has fallen short of a careful review of the social aspects of security policy formulation and 
implementation. An interpretive case-study research is used to conduct the research. Our unit of analysis is a 
mature, large Indonesian government-owned commercial bank. The case was chosen because a security breach 
had just unfolded while the research project was being set up. This allowed us to study how a security policy 
gets shaped and what lessons there might be from an institutional and a structuration standpoint. Our findings 
hark back at the importance of good design of systems and proper consideration of social and political aspects 
in the configuration of security policies. One of the major contributions of the research presented in the paper 
relates to how institutional theory can be used to demonstrate how institutional forces affect the design and the 
use of security policies.  
Keywords: IS security and privacy, Institutionalization, Security policies, Structuration theory, Institutional 
theory. 
 
 
1 Introduction 
There is a problem with the management of information security in organizations. While significant research has 
been undertaken in defining good security policies (Dhillon, 1997; Dhillon and Torkzadeh, 2006), yet the 
compliance between rules prescribed by a security policy and what organizations actually do is limited at best. 
There is no clear indication as to how security policies are internalized and how such internalization prevents a 
security breach (Dhillon, 2007). While researchers of late have addressed the behavioral aspects of IS security, 
the related social aspects of the problem have largely been overlooked (Björck, 2004). Studies in information 
security have vaguely explored the link between security policies, security behaviors, and security breaches.  
In this study we investigate how security policies are formed in organizations, insitutionalized, and therefore 
prevent security breaches. The context of our research is the Indonesian banking sector. For the purposes of this 
study we have identified a case study involving an Indonesian government-owned commercial bank. The 
Indonesian banking sector offers an interesting opportunity to undertake this research. This is because while 
information security is undoubtedly considered important, yet the rules pertaining to information security do not 
seem to have gotten entrenched. In this paper we make two assertions. First, a good security policy is a basis for 
a bank to ensure stability of its operations. Hence it is important to ensure that a security policy gets 
institutionalized. Second, the central bank needs to ensure that a proper climate for institutionalization exists. We 
explore these assertions in the context of our case research and in particular address the following research 
questions: 
1) How information security policies and practices are shaped and assimilated in an organization. 
2) How an external central governance body (e.g., the central bank) affects the institutionalization of 
information security policies and practices. 
3) How security breaches reshape security policies and reassimilate these in an organization. 
In addressing the research questions we use institutional theory (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; Scott, 2008) and 
Gidden’s structuration theory to understand the structural, processual, and dominance issues and how they shape 
institutionalization. The combination of institutionalization and structuration is undertaken based on Barley and 
Tolbert (1997) synthesis. Using institutionalization helps “explain why formal security structures and actual 
security behavior differs” (Björck, 2004, p. 5). An indepth case study approach in the tradition of Walsham 
(1993; 1995) and Eisenhardt (1989) is adopted. 
2 Prior Literature 
However there is a gap in the literature as to which influences (e.g., security breach, external central governance 
body etc) shape and reshape security policies. The literature is also unclear about how new security policies that 
are gradually internalized direct the use of technical security artifacts and security behavior. There are three 
informing bodies of literature pertaining to the research presented in this paper – security policy formulation and 
implementation, institutionalization, and structuration, which are discussed below. 
Security Policy Formulation and Implmentation. There is a general consensus as to what an information 
security policy might be. Smith and Jamieson (2006) for instance define information security policies as rules 
that ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information and assets to protect from theft, 
tampering, manipulation, or corruption. Chandra (2008) states that the initiation of information security policies 
denotes management’s commitment to advance and safeguard information as an asset. Ross (2008) considers 
information security policies and standards to depict management objectives with respect to protection. 
In the literature the relationship between formulation and implementation of security policies to security 
breaches is tenuous at best. Doherty and Fulford (2005) for example found no significant relationship between 
the formulation and implementation of information security policies and the incidence of severity of information 
security breaches. They suggest that factors such as difficulty in building awareness, problems in policy 
enforcement, complexity of policy standards, inadequacy of resources, and failure to cutomize policies, as the 
main reason for security breaches. Baskerville and Siponen (2002) also enunciate the importance to formulate 
security policy, particularly in an emergent organization, for the implementation and development of information 
systems security. They observe the importance of either a single security policy or several security policies 
derived from distinct policy levels or types. Doherty et al. (2009) state that the importance of formulating and 
applying formal security policy can prevent security breaches from occurring and hence safeguard organizational 
information. 
Doherty and Fulford (2006) have also argued that by carefully and explicitly aligning information security policy 
and strategic information systems plan enhances the security of information systems. They find that there is a 
strong impact of a carefully designed information security policy on the planning of strategic information 
systems. Knapp et al. (2006) find that top management support has a significant impact on the enforcement of 
information security policy as well as the organization’s security culture. Herath and Rao (2009) note that policy 
attitudes are determined by threat perceptions and organizational commitment. 
Security policies therefore depict management objectives of and commitment to information security (Chandra, 
2008; Ross, 2008). Intervention and support by management, or a higher authority, are crucial to formulate and 
implement security policies (Knapp et al., 2006). While security policies are an important determinant to achieve 
sound information security, concerns reside with an actors commitment and interaction with security policies 
(Doherty and Fulford 2005). Clearly a security policies may be cosidered seriously if a goven actor comprehends 
the seriousousness of potential threats (Herath and Rao, 2009). Unfortunately however many stakeholders 
exhibit a false sense of security and perceive their information asset to be safe (Rhee et al. 2005). Eventually 
when a security policy may be considered, there is usually a problem with current practices having been 
entrenched in the systems. This means that for a policy to be successful, sigificant unlearning and relearning is 
required. It is therefore important to ensure adequate interventions at suitable times such that the right kind of 
practices get institutionalized.  
Institutionalization. An abstract view of an institution is that it is a result of ongoing “typification of 
habitualized actions” by social actors (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 54). The concept entails a socially 
constructed representation of repetitive actions that become a habit among social actors. Institutionalization 
hence is a social process of creating an institutionalized social structure (Berger and Luckmann, 1966; Giddens, 
1984; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; Scott, 2008). Powell and DiMaggio (1991) state that formal organizations 
become institutions through institutionalization. Hence institutionalization is best represented as a particular state 
or property of a social pattern. Scott (1987) refers to institutionalization as a process to instil values beyond the 
technical requirements of a task over time, and as a process of creating social reality, which is independent of 
actor’s view and actions, but is taken for granted. The “typification of habitualized actions” concept implies the 
impact of history and control on activities within an institution. History is needed for an institution to reflect on 
its past records, i.e., to reproduce itself in a modified form. Control is required as a method to ensure an 
institution to function according to its legitimacy. Powell and DiMaggio (1991) introduce four avenues of 
institutional reproduction: (1) the exercise of power, (2) complex interdependencies, (3) taken-for-granted 
assumptions, and (4) path-dependent development processes. Barley and Tolbert (1997) argue, however, that 
institutionalization has not depicted a comprehensive process of institutionalizing formal structure since 
institutionalists do not empirically denote the creation, alteration, and reproduction of institutions. 
Structuration. Structuration is built upon the notion of rules and resources that shape social structures (i.e., 
signification, domination, and legitimation). According to Giddens (1984), the social structures are socially 
constructed through the interactions between agency and modalities (i.e., interpretation, artifacts, and 
regulations). The interactions create a continuous process of structures and enactment. Scholars have introduced 
the concept of duality of structure whereby agency’s interactions with modalities affect the production and 
reproduction of social structures (Walsham, 1993; Walsham and Han, 1991). Orlikowski (1992) introduces the 
notion of duality of technology, providing a critique of the view of technology either as an objective force or as a 
social construction of reality. In her later work, Orlikowski (2000) focuses on how structures are dynamically 
enacted through various interactions between agency and technology. Similarly, Barley (1986) investigates how 
similar technologies can be used to produce dynamic and continuous technology-use structuration in two 
different entities, hence producing distinct social structures. He argues that the variety of social structures 
produced by the same technology can best be understood by viewing the social form and social action. Barley 
and Tolbert (1997) implement the concepts of social form and social action by integrating structuration and 
institutionalization as an attempt to complement each framework. In relation to information security, Huebner 
and Britt (2006) explore the three structures to investigate the impact of information security behavior on 
internal security controls. 
The core of structuration is the duality of structure, which primarily focuses on the modalities. Two of the three 
modalities (i.e., artifacts and regulations) are particularly more important to our study. Orlikowski and Iacono 
(2001) state that an artifact is an object that is manufactured, used, or modified by humans. Regulations can be 
used to sanctioning the interaction between agency and artifacts. According to Selznick (1969, p. 8), law is 
required to enforce control and order, and is therefore necessary as a tool to promote “peace, settle disputes, 
suppress deviance.” In relation to our study, such laws are embedded in an organization’s security policy. 
3 Theoretical Development 
As noted previously, central to our study is the combination of institutionalization and structuration. 
Structuration scholars have denoted that the duality of structure, which is a manifestation of synergistic 
relationship between agency and structures, to provide a basis for interactions between agency and modalities. In 
due course such interactions become routinized, are rationalized and subsequently taken for granted (Giddens, 
1984; Orlikowski, 1992; Orlikowski, 2000; Orlikowski et al., 1995; Walsham, 1993; Walsham and Han, 1991). 
As interactions become rationale and regimented amongst members of a social system, social order and stability 
begin to take effect. By nature, institutional theory resents the notion of change. Such resentment therefore 
inquires the epistemic and the ontology of maintaining and reproducing social order and stability (Burrell and 
Morgan, 1979). Members of a social system strive to achieve similar goals and are tempted to internalize and 
repeat their actions to maintain social order, thus creating an institution (Scott, 2008). In order to depict the 
maintenance of social order, Giddens introduces two realms (as noted by Barley and Tolbert, 1997) -  agency 
representing action and structures representing institution. Our view of an institution is informed by Powell and 
DiMaggio (1991, p. 145)’s definition – “a social order or pattern that has attained a certain state or property.” 
According to Scott (2008), however, an institution always changes forms as it is being challenged and is never 
created from inexistence. When an institution is challenged and social change unavoidably takes effect, an 
institution changes its appearance, replacing the older format. Hence it is said that an institution is 
reinstitutionalized (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). The new format forces members of a social system to 
reinternalize new routines of action until such actions become established. Integrating institutionalization and 
structuration therefore demands that the two realms – action and institution – be analyzed in conjunction to 
modelling how social structures are created, maintained, and altered. 
The Institutional Realm. The notion of “institutional realm,” introduced by Barley (1986) and Barley and 
Tolbert (1997), lends the concept of resistance to change to the duality of structure. Institutional realm is an 
abstract framework of typifications and rules derived from a cumulative history of action and interaction (Barley, 
1986; Barley and Tolbert, 1997) by which an agency utilizes to make sense of its actions. The institutional realm 
inscribes three social structures – signification, domination, and legitimation – as being abstract institutional 
properties that are produced, maintained, and altered. 
Despite being institutional properties, the three social structures are simply assumed and are not central to the 
maintenance of the institutional realm. Scholars of institutionalization and structuration have the tendency to 
focus on different impacts of actions on institutional realm as a whole. While they provide individual views of 
such impacts on signification, domination, and legitimation, the social structures are merely an abstraction of 
reality with limited empirical evidence (Barley and Tolbert, 1997). Focusing on institutionalization alone does 
not guarantee useful insights to the process of organizing as both institutional and structuration theory 
complement one another. Using the institutional realm to represent the three social structures allows for 
modeling processes of institutionalization. 
The Realm of Action. Another important concept is the realm of action, which depicts the “actual arrangements 
of people, objects, and events in the minute-by-minute flow of the setting’s history” (Barley, 1986) or the “social 
life’s unfolding” (Barley and Tolbert, 1997). This realm represents the continuous interaction between agency 
and resources, taking into account the impact of other modalities such as interpretive schemes and regulations. It 
does not, therefore, represent agency alone. While the institutional realm is labelled “realized structure,” the 
realm of action is termed “interaction order” (Barley, 1986). 
The interaction between agency and technology has long been a focus to scholars of technology and 
organizations. Orlikowski (1992) states that technology is both a human creation (i.e. an objective force) and a 
meaningful artifact to humans when used in an ordered manner (i.e. social construction of reality). She 
maintains, however, that viewing the two perspectives independently causes failure to investigate how the use of 
technology becomes structured. Her later work shows that ongoing use of technology recursively produces 
structures of technology use in different patterns as agency may experience interaction with different 
technologies (Orlikowski, 2000). 
Institutionalization. The institutional realm and the realm of action represent the link between action and 
institution, which according to Barley and Tolbert (1997), help in delineation of recursive structurations. Action 
and institution recursively shape each other over time: a structuralized institution shapes agency’s actions while 
agency’s actions structuralize institution. Institution is enacted using a script, which serves as a link between 
action and institution (Barley, 1986; Barley and Tolbert, 1997). Script represents the interaction order, indicating 
“observable, recurrent activities and patterns of interaction characteristics of a particular setting” (Barley and 
Tolbert, 1997, p. 98). 
While the term structure is used rather differently by scholars (i.e., Barley, Orlikowski, and Walsham), Barley 
uses the term structure and institution interchangeably. Rather than looking at how the use of resources shapes 
structures (as per Orlikowski’s conception), Barley focuses on structuration as a process and hence uses the word 
institutionalization to refer to structuration. Our theoretical stance is closely aligned with Barley’s 
conceptualization. 
In the information security context, the institutional realm manifests the interplay between security-control 
dimensions: technical, formal, and informal controls (Dhillon, 2007; Dhillon and Moores, 2001). Whereas 
technical controls focus on the use of security technology as well as overlooking the technical aspect of 
information security, formal controls and informal controls dictate actors’ behavior to promote information 
security in an organization. The stable structuration (or institutionalization) of information security is a product 
of managing the integrity of the three security-control dimensions in an organization (Dhillon, 2007). The 
institutionalization framework by Barley and Tolbert (1997) is important to describe the case study and to 
structure the discussion and findings. The case study is therefore divided into two subsections: the normal 
condition and the security breach incident that specifically explains the reinstitutionalization instance. The case 
study research presented in the next section looks at how security policy in a commercial bank becomes 
institutionalized and structuralized in a series of formulation, implementation, and modification (or 
reformulation). 
4 The Case Study 
This section presents the empirical analysis for our study. We use an interpretive case study of security policy 
institutionalization in a large Indonesian government-owned commercial bank. 
4.1 Research Methodology 
The combination of institutional theory and structuration theory appropriates the use of an interpretive scheme, 
since structuration theory involves the communicative interaction among subjects; a property captured only by 
using an interpretive scheme (Berger and Luckmann, 1966; Giddens, 1984). An interpretive research design thus 
requires that the methodology begin with “the position that our knowledge of reality, including the domain of 
human action, is a social construction by human actors” (Walsham, 2006, p. 320). The interpretive scheme 
provides various methodologies to analyze data: ethnography, hermeneutics, case study research, grounded 
theory and action research. Our study uses the case study method, which allows social scientists “to retain the 
holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events – such as individual life cycles, organizational and 
managerial processes, neighborhood change, international relations and the maturation of industries” (Yin, 2003, 
p. 2). Furthermore, “a case study examines a phenomenon in its natural setting, employing multiple methods of 
data collection to gather information from one or a few entities (people, groups or organizations)” (Benbasat et 
al., 1987, p. 370). Several important procedures in a case-study research are selection of cases, crafting 
instruments and protocols which allow researchers to select appropriate data collection methods, analyzing 
within-case data when exhaustive amount of data is present, and searching for cross-case patterns by creating 
categories and looking for similarities in the categories (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
We select Centro Metropolitan Bank as our unit of analysis since the bank is a mature, large government-owned 
commercial bank with excellent customer service and a large financial asset. Our findings indicate that such 
success is attributed to the bank’s good information systems and significant experiences in dealing with 
information security. The case study was conducted between summers of 2010 and 2011. Interviews were 
undertaken with key stakeholders, including top ranking executives, middle managers and front-end staff. IT 
personnel were also included into the respondent pool. In all over 30 hours of interview data was collected. 
While interviews were the primary source of data, extensive secondary materials were also reviewed and 
analyzed. We used semi-structured interviews to allow for flexibility in probing respondents. We transcribed the 
interviews and analyzed patterns and categories that match the focus of our study (e.g., security policy, rules, 
EDC machines, IT, security, control, etc.). 
4.2 The Case of Centro Metropolitan Bank 
The Centro Metropolitan Bank, formed in October 1998 as part of the Government of Indonesia’s bank 
restructuring program, establishes IT infrastructure that provides straight-through processing and a unified 
interface for customers. The bank is directed by an executive management team of Board of Directors, headed by 
a President. The management and governance is supervised by the Board of Commissioners appointed directly 
by the nation’s Ministry of State-Owned Enterprise. As a large institution, each division is managed by a director 
and each oversees groups that play a significant role supplying the bank’s operational needs. The governance and 
practices of information security are managed solely by the IT security department, which is part of the IT 
Planning, Architecture, and Business Continuity Planning (BCP) group. This group is structured under the 
Technology and Operations Division, which is responsible for overseeing all issues regarding the 
implementation of IT system in the bank and by the bank’s customers. 
Centro Metropolitan Bank regards reputational risk, which is closely linked to operational risk, as a leading 
cause to crowding out of customers, potentially creating financial loss. With regard to information security and 
to security of using technology, Centro Metropolitan Bank identifies access to information and the use of 
technology to exhibit potentially damaging risk when they are not properly handled. The bank characterizes such 
risk as an operational risk and abides to the handling of such risk using Basel II framework as a guideline. 
4.2.1 Security Policy Formulation and Implementation 
The internal information-security practices in Centro Metropolitan Bank are initiated solely by the IT security 
department. In the words of the Vice President of IT Security: 
“The vision and mission of the IT security department is based on the idea to safeguard our information 
assets. The formal statement is prescribed in the functionality statement of our department, stating to 
conduct the analysis, the formulation, the synthesis, the development, the implementation, and the 
evaluation of an IT security instrument to ensure the security of information technology as an asset, 
whether physical or logical (i.e., data and information) of the bank in a short term and in a long term.” 
The IT security department is responsible for the creation and adoption of security rules. The department consists 
of three subunits: (1) the IT security solutions unit that conducts the IT security systems development, (2) the IT 
security access and control unit that oversees the user access and privilege, and (3) the IT security strategy and 
planning unit that formulates the IT security strategic plan and blueprint as well as the IT security policy and 
procedures. The IT security policy and procedures are therefore an exclusive privilege of the IT security 
department. Not only are the policies aligned with the bank’s organizational culture and strategy (Doherty and 
Fulford, 2006), but the policies are also initiated according to the central bank’s information security guidelines. 
As a practice to adhere to the central bank’s policies and regulations, Centro Metropolitan Bank, as a commercial 
bank, delivers regular (e.g., weekly, monthly, or annual) reports to the central bank and welcomes audit visits by 
a team dispatched by the central bank. Despite its diligent reporting practices, Centro Metropolitan Bank 
attempts not to involve the central bank in issues that the bank is confronting; rather the bank strives to conform 
and abide to the central bank’s policies and regulations and to consult security issues with the central bank when 
necessary. The interference by the central bank often results in bad publicity for a commercial bank since this 
bank may be perceived as being unreliable and unable to resolve problems on its own. Despite allowing for 
minimum interference from the central bank, Centro Metropolitan Bank strives to maintain good institutional 
relationship with the central bank.  
Centro Metropolitan Bank rigorously maintains its information systems and their security, particularly through 
the bank’s IT security department. As a result, it possesses some of the most well designed corporate information 
systems in the nation. The bank prides itself in assuring that its most precious information (i.e., its customers’ 
data) has never been breached. The information technology security is maintained and preserved by the IT 
security department. One of the department’s goals is to assure the security of information technology assets, 
either the physical or logical components (i.e., data and information), both in the short and long run. This 
department also formulates policies and regulations of how information technology and electronic applications 
are to be used to preserve information security. Electronic applications include the bank’s intranet system, 
electronic banking, ATMs, electronic data capture (EDC) machines, etc. In addition to maintaining the proper 
use of information technology, the department also educates stakeholders and raises their awareness of the 
importance of information security. The Head of IT Audit Unit maintains that: 
“All tasks that include regulating, enforcing, controlling, and revising standard operating procedures 
or policies regarding risk of using IT are performed by the information technology department. They 
assume full responsibility for these tasks.” 
In addition to managing technology risk, the bank also believes that threat to information security may be due to 
human factors. The practice of securing its information adheres to the definition of operational risk by Basel II. 
When auditing the bank’s information systems, the central bank’s audit team investigates factors that contribute 
to operational risk: people (e.g., faults due to human error or lack of responsibility), process (e.g., false 
procedures), external factors (e.g., hackers or outsiders), and system (i.e., technology) (Flores et al., 2006, p. 
384; Scandizzo, 2005). Many procedures and standards are formulated in a way that belong to and 
comprehended by bank’s personnel and customers. These procedures and standards are developed using ISO 
27001 framework, particularly for a certain specific scope such as the one that regulates data centers. To audit 
the bank’s information systems and its security, the auditory team uses a combination of ISO 27001 and COBIT 
(i.e., for high level maintenance use such as governing risks related to the use of information technology). In 
addition to these frameworks, procedures and standards are formulated to conform and reflect regulations issued 
by the central bank. 
4.2.2 An Instance of Electronic Data Capture (EDC) Fraud 
The institutionalization of security policy in Centro Metropolitan Bank can best be depicted by the case of 
electronic data capture (EDC) fraud. In general, the EDC fraud case is an information security fraud case of 
which a fictitious merchant, a fictitious customer, and hence a fictitious transaction provided financial loss to a 
commercial bank. Parties other than the fictitious merchant and customer directly involved in this case, which 
occurred while the study was being conducted, include Centro Metropolitan Bank and another commercial bank, 
Blue Silver Bank, which directly suffered from the financial loss. This case also drew interference from the 
central bank, which acted as an intermediary between the two banks and as a consultant. This case indirectly 
involved a credit card issuer, which in this case was Visa. The case had never been made public as it had the 
potential to significantly damage the reputation of both the commercial banks involved. Both banks realized that 
if the case became public, they would lose reputation and credibility in the eyes of the public. In addition, Blue 
Silver Bank suffered a financial loss of more than US $1 million. The accounting and payment system 
supervisors of Blue Silver Bank examined Centro Metropolitan Bank and demanded progress reports on 
resolution, action plan, and mitigation progress from Centro Metropolitan Bank through the audit department. 
Progress was monitored and reports were requested and delivered for a period spanning six months prior and 
after the breach. In addition, the central bank also conducted random inspections to all EDC machines as an 
attempt to ensure that EDC machines are for online transaction only and enacted a policy that commercial banks 
should provide merchants with EDC machines that only allow online transaction. The central bank provided a 
six-month grace period for commercial banks with offline-transaction EDC machines to switch to machines for 
online transaction only. The central bank also heightened the policy to request EDC machines from a merchant 
to a commercial bank. 
Centro Metropolitan Bank undertook several important measures, particularly its security policies, to prevent a 
similar case from occurring. The bank modified its EDC transaction policies and ensured that all such 
transactions were online, including those involving another bank as either the issuing bank or the acquiring bank. 
The bank upgraded the security of its EDC machines, reformatted the merchant acquisition policies to ensure no 
fictitious merchants are involved in EDC transactions, formed a new unit whose task was to monitor transactions 
involving debit card and maintain the card’s fraud control, and modified the back office that handled electronic 
transactions so that it is able to immediately detect a transaction that were suspected to be fraudulent. 
The EDC fraud incident also triggered the heightening of other security policies for Centro Metropolitan Bank’s 
electronic banking. For example, the bank reinforces the importance to use PIN on its text-messaging banking 
system through extensive customer education. The text-messaging banking system is a unique electronic-
banking system that allows customers to use simple-text messaging service to conduct electronic-banking 
transactions. The E-Banking Product Manager describes the heightened policies for text-messaging banking 
system as follow: 
“We provide policies for customers who wish to use our SMS (i.e., text-messaging) banking system and 
educate our customers on how to use this system. For example, they are required to create a PIN 
during activation and we show them how to do this through pamphlets. This breakthrough program is 
not a required electronic banking product decreed by the central bank.” 
5 Discussion 
The case study provides insights as to how security policy in an organization is formulated, implemented, and 
reformulated when an incident of security breach occurs. These three processes reflect an institutionalization of a 
resource modality. We treat the security policy depicted in the case study as a resource modality that 
institutionalizes security structure at Centro Metropolitan Bank. Our case study, however, depicted an external 
interference by the central bank in the institutionalization of security in Centro Metropolitan Bank. Such 
interference forces participation of the bank’s executives and managers in championing security policy (Knapp 
et al., 2006). We develop our case analysis discussion using mainly Barley and Tolbert’s sequential model of 
institutionalization (see Barley and Tolbert, 1997, p. 101). We focus our attention on the structuration of 
institutional realm and its reciprocal effect on the realm of action. We also focus on the impact of script 
enactment in the institutionalization. 
The institutional realm is an abstraction of regulated use of resources/materials drawn from experience. As an 
organization, Centro Metropolitan Bank has had such established abstraction creating an institutionalized 
information security or a stable structure of information security. In addition, as a commercial bank, the 
institutionalization of information security has a strong influence by the central bank. The institutionalization of 
information security through formulation and implementation of security policy is accomplished due to the 
cultural aspects of Centro Metropolitan Bank as a unique and independent entity (Huebner and Britt, 2006), 
implementing security policy that reflects the characteristics and cultures of the bank. Security culture 
implemented in an organization, including Centro Metropolitan Bank, reflects shared patterns of regulated use of 
security resources in a formal system (organizational structure), supported by the informal system (social 
members sharing their experience in informal communications) (Dhillon, 2007). In our case study, the 
institutional realm is reestablished when the central bank decrees new information security guidelines or when a 
security breach incident occurs (e.g., the case of EDC fraud). 
The realm of action signifies the compliance with security policy and the impact of such compliance. Agency 
requires formal controls (e.g., regulations) and informal controls (e.g., informal shared norms and beliefs) to 
interact with resources and materials (e.g., EDC machines). Only in this way does the interaction become 
institutionalized and satisfy the organization’s cultures and strategy (Doherty and Fulford, 2006). The established 
and internalized realm of action strengthens the institutional realm and helps maintain the social order. Our case 
study demonstrates the continuous interaction between Centro Metropolitan Bank’s management staffs and 
employees (i.e., the agency at the Centro Metropolitan Bank) with EDC machines directed by the use of security 
policy. When the central bank passes new security guidelines, the agency is required to formulate new security 
policies that adopt the new guidelines and to implement the new policies. When the new policies are adopted and 
implemented over time, agency’s use of the new security policies become habitualized and structuralized and 
agency’s interaction with IT artifacts is well directed. The EDC fraud case, however, is the force to the 
reinstitutionalization of security policy in Centro Metropolitan Bank, prompting the central bank to decree new 
security guidelines to be adopted by commercial banks and financial institutions without exception. 
Figure 1 depicts the institutionalization of security policy in Centro Metropolitan Bank using Barley and 
Tolbert’s model of sequential model of institutionalization. The model depicted in the figure demonstrates three 
moments of scripts enactment: (1) the first box (i.e., setting T1) depicts a moment when the central bank passes 
new security guidelines, (2) the second box (i.e., setting T2) depicts a moment when Centro Metropolitan Bank’s 
personnel and customers are familiar with the new policies and have habitualized the use of EDC machines, and 
(3) the third box (setting T3) depicts how the EDC fraud case causes the reinstitutionalization of security 
policies. Each box depicts four distinct processes shown by four arrows. 
When the central bank issues new security guidelines, the institutional principles that contain the new security 
guidelines as the raw ingredient are encoded in the scripts for setting T1 (see arrow a). As the scripts become 
available, the bank’s personnel enact the scripts that encode the institutional principles (see arrow b). The scripts 
become a guideline for the personnel to use IT artifacts (e.g., an EDC machine) according to the policies. As the 
scripts are new due to the central bank’s recent enforcement, Centro Metropolitan Bank’s personnel have yet had 
the opportunity to internalize the scripts and habitualize their actions. The Centro Metropolitan Bank’s personnel 
are aware and conscious of their behavior to follow the scripts to use the security policies, signifying the 
modification of an institution (Barley and Tolbert, 1997, p. 102) of security policies. Arrow c depicts a situation 
when the personnel’s actions replicate the scripts that were initially guiding the personnel’s actions. We do not 
offer a revision to the scripts due to the nature of commercial banks’ conformity to the central bank’s prudential 
supervision to maintain status quo (i.e., stability). Hence we assume that revision to the scripts derives only from 
the central bank’s new guidelines or any security breach incident. Finally, arrow d signifies the moment when 
the scripts that contain replication of personnel’s actions become objectified and externalized in the institutional 
realm. 
 
 
Figure 1. A Sequential Model of Security Policy Institutionalization at Centro Metropolitan Bank Based 
on Barley and Tolbert (1997) 
Setting T2 depicts the controlled maintenance of the scripts and actions. This setting begins with the central bank 
regularly monitoring the use of EDC machines of commercial banks, including such machines belonging to 
Centro Metropolitan Bank. Such monitoring (i.e., control and governance) is conducted by the central bank by 
regularly dispatching auditory team to visit Centro Metropolitan Bank while Centro Metropolitan Bank regularly 
submits policy implementation reports to the central bank. This monitoring, however, does not aim to modify the 
implementation of security policies. Instead, the monitoring activities aim to maintain stability of such 
implementations. Arrow e depicts the encoding of familiar institution of security policies in the scripts, which 
are enacted by Centro Metropolitan Bank’s personnel (see arrow f). The difference is that the personnel may 
have internalized the scripts. The bank’s personnel may automatically act according to the scripts and may be 
unconscious of what they are doing. This is the moment when their actions become internalized and are viewed 
as rational amongst their colleagues and supervisors in the bank. They further unconsciously replicate the scripts 
(see arrow g) and the scripts remain an objectification in the institutional realm (see arrow h). Setting T2 
demonstrates, however, that strong involvement and interference by the central bank exercising a centralized, 
concentrated, power proves “to compel a change in the culture of regulation” (Schooner and Taylor, 2009, p. 
272), particularly in developing countries such as Indonesia. Literature and observations do not, however, 
support such statement in developed countries such as the United States. Too much concentrated power by the 
central bank may actually cause negative effects (e.g., a commercial bank might be reluctant to exercise its 
freedom to formulate and implement security policies due to fear of the central bank retaliating by limiting the 
commercial bank’s security activities) in banking sector of developed countries (Schooner and Taylor, 2009). 
The transfer from setting T1 to setting T2 depicts the formulation and implementation of security policies in an 
organization. Setting T1 particularly deals with the development of security policy (arrow a), consultation and 
approval (arrow b), and security awareness and policy education (arrows b and c) (see the security policies 
building summary provided by Hong et al., 2006). Setting T2 resembles the dissemination of security policies 
and delineates the moment when security policies become aligned with the bank’s strategic information systems 
plan in preserving security of information in the bank (Doherty and Fulford, 2006), signifying the internalization 
and habitualization of security policy use. 
Setting T3 demonstrates how incidental case drives the central bank to exercise its deontic power and 
constitutive power once more by formulating and enforcing new security guidelines. Deontic power is a power 
ascribed to the central bank due to its authoritative status in banking sector while constitutive power is a power 
possessed by the central bank to decree and enforce rules (Hall, 2008). The difference between setting T1 and 
setting T3 is that setting T1 may or may not be driven by a security-breach incidental case. The 
institutionalization of security policies in setting T3 (arrows i, j, k, and l), however, is similar to the process 
depicted in setting T1 (arrows a, b, c, and d). Assuming there is no other incidental case occurring, setting T2 
recurs as setting T4 as Centro Metropolitan Bank’s adopts the new security guidelines to formulate its own 
security policies and internalize the implementation of its new security policies to direct personnel’s interaction 
with EDC machines. 
6 Conclusion 
This study demonstrates how security policies in a commercial bank are formulated and become institutionalized 
over time to direct security behavior and prevent security breaches. We are concerned with the fact that security 
policies are being rigorously formulated yet security breaches are still an issue. We are therefore looking at what 
actually occurs should compliance take effect and also when an incident of security breach takes place. We 
choose to combine institutionalization and structuration to investigate such effects taking place. Hence the use of 
a combination of institutional theory and structuration theory is appropriate for modelling the institutionalization 
of security policies. We conduct an empirical observation involving a large government-owned commercial bank 
in Indonesia as an example of how institutionalization of security policies proceeds (recall that scholars have 
denoted that institutions never emerge from nothing). Our empirical observation indicates a major finding that 
entails stable institutionalization of security policies as an impact of strong involvement and interference by the 
central bank. This is because the central bank exercises not only its power to regulate the formulation and 
implementation of security policies, but also its power to control and monitor such formulation and 
implementation among commercial banks. The paper provides useful insights for scholars to establish their 
research agenda by making use of our findings and for practitioners to consider our findings as a best practice to 
implement security policies. 
The use of either institutional theory or structuration theory is not common in studies of information security 
since scholars tend to focus so much on the technical aspects of information security (Dhillon and Backhouse, 
2001). Findings of research presented in this paper provide a major contribution to the socio-organizational 
studies of information security by demonstrating the effectiveness and efficiency of formulating and 
implementing security policies from a sociological stance. The highlight of such contribution is the delineation 
of how internalized security policies control security behavior and direct the use of IT artifact’s security features 
that prevent security breach from occurring in subsequent episodes. In terms of theory, our study illustrates how 
institutional theory can be used to demonstrate how institutional forces (e.g., formal structure and the central 
bank’s involvement) affect the design and the use of security policies (Björck, 2004). Our study also shows that 
security breach incident and central bank’s interference are a contributing factor to improve and internalize 
security policies. 
The field-work was however not without limitations. Firstly, our empirical observation is conducted in a 
developing country. Literature has indicated a different approach of control and governance by the central bank 
in developed countries. We suggest conducting empirical observations in banking sector of developed countries 
as a comparison to our study. Secondly, literature in banking studies has introduced the concept of prudential 
supervision by the central bank. Our study has yet to demonstrate an intense institutional relationship between a 
commercial bank and the central bank. We are certain that the information security governance elucidates the 
interaction between knowledgeable human agents and the wider social system within which they are elucidated. 
By taking into account the concepts of information security governance and prudential supervision, we believe 
that scholars should be able to delineate and demonstrate holistic information security governance in banking 
sector. 
Our findings may be a source of theoretical model to formulate and implement security policies in a commercial 
bank. Practitioners can benefit from the theoretical model by looking at the impact of control and governance of 
an external higher authority on their operational activities. Practitioners can also benefit from considering the 
extent to which using security artifacts needs the effort to raise employee’s awareness of security issues and 
taking into account reasonable amount of time and resources to allow for effective and efficient use of security 
artifacts. 
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